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Support And Property Rights Of
The Putative Spouse
By FLORENCE J. LUTHER*
and
CHARLES W. LUTHER**
Orequire a "non-husband" to divide his assets with and to pay
support to a "non-wife" may, at first glance, appear doctrinaire. How-
ever, to those familiar with the putative spouse doctrine as it had de-
veloped in California the concept should not be too disquieting. In
1969 the California legislature enacted Civil Code sections 4452 and
4455 which respectively authorize a division of property1 and perma-
nent supportF to be paid to a putative spouse upon a judgment of an-
nulment.' Prior to the enactment of these sections, a putative spouse
in California was given an equitable right to a division of jointly ac-
quired property,4 but could not recover permanent support upon the
termination of the putative relationship.5 This article considers the ef-
fect of these newly enacted sections on the traditional rights of a puta-
tive spouse to share in a division of property and to recover in quasi-
contract for the reasonable value of services rendered during the puta-
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
** Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
1. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, at 3322-23, as amended CAL. Civ. CODE §
4452 (West Supp. 1972).
2. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, at 3323, as amended CAL. Civ. CODE § 4455
(West Supp. 1972).
3. California Civil Code section 4455 (West Supp. 1972) additionally provides
that the court may "during the pendency of a proceeding to have a marriage adjudged
a nullity" order a party to pay for the support of a putative spouse. Prior case law
recognized the right to temporary support in the case of a voidable marriage. See Mid-
dlecoff v. Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d 286, 340 P.2d 331 (1959). However, where a
void marriage was involved, the cases expressly denied temporary support. In re Cook,
42 Cal. App. 2d 1, 108 P.2d 46 (1940).
4. Blache v. Blache, 69 Cal. App. 2d 616, 160 P.2d 136 (1945).
5. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937); Middlecoff v.
Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d 286, 340 P.2d 331 (1959).
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tive relationship. Also considered are the effects of Civil Code section
5118 on the legal spouse's rights as opposed to those of a putative
spouse.
The Putative Spouse Doctrine
A putative marriage is commonly defined as a solemnized mar-
riage in which one or both parties are unaware of an impediment that
causes the marriage to be void or voidable.' To protect the innocent
spouse-the one acting in good faith-California has long recognized
such a relationship as being quasi-marital and has allowed such a party
certain rights which would accrue in a lawful marriage. 7  This is to be
distinguished from the situation where the relationship is deemed to be
meretricious, that is, one in which both parties are aware that the rela-
tionship is illicit. In that case neither can be classified as a putative
spouse. A typical consequence of such a meretricious relationship is
that there can be neither division of property accumulated by either
party nor quasi-contractual recovery."
Impact of Section 4452 upon the
Division of Quasi-Marital Property
Section 4452 of the Civil Code provides in part:
Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or voida-
ble and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in
6. Estate of Foy, 109 Cal. App. 2d 329, 240 P.2d 685 (1952); W. DE FUNIAK &
M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 96 (2d ed. 1971). While most
states require a ceremony before there can be a putative marriage, a few decisions have
held it is not necessary. Succession of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935),
noted in 10 TUL. L. REV. 435 (1936). California Civil Code section 4206 (West 1970)
provides: "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the par-
ties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they
take each other as husband and wife." California Civil Code section 4452 (West Supp.
1972) provides in part: "Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or
voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith
that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such party or parties to have the
status of a putative spouse ...... Many states have not adopted the concept of a
putative marriage. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 52-53 (1968); 20 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 91, 92 (1963); 2 WILLAMETrE L.J. 207 (1962).
7. See Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 P. 533 (1920); Turknette v.
Turknette, 100 Cal. App. 2d 271, 223 P.2d 495 (1950); H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 54 (1968); Evans, Property Interests Arising from Quasi-Marital Relations,
9 CORNELL L. REV. 246 (1924).
8. Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943). However, as Vallera
points out, each spouse is entitled to share in property jointly accumulated in pro-
portion to the spouse's contribution. No express agreement between the parties to di-
vide the property need exist.
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good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such
party or parties to have the status of a putative spouse, and, if the
division of property is in issue, shall divide, in accordance with Sec-
tion 4800, that property acquired during the union which would
have been community property or quasi-community property if the
union had not been void or voidable. 9
Section 4800 requires, with limited exceptions, that where there is a
valid marriage, the court must make an equal division of all the com-
munity and quasi-community property. 10 In the case of a putative mar-
riage, such property is now described as "quasi-marital property.""
To determine the impact of section 4452, some background on the de-
velopment of the putative spouse doctrine is helpful.
Pre-Section 4452 Remedies for the Putative Spouse
Traditionally, California cases based the putative spouse's right to
share in jointly accumulated property on one or both of the following
theories: 12 the quasi-community property doctrine13 and general equita-
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1972).
10. The exceptions to the requirement of equal division of community and quasi-
community property are: (1) where, pursuant to California Civil Code section 4800(a)
(West Supp. 1972), the parties agree in writing, or on oral stipulation of the parties
in open court, to an unequal division; (2) where, pursuant to section 4800(b) (2), the
court exercises its power to make awards to offset amounts "deliberately misappropri-
ated" by one party "to the exclusion of the community property or quasi-community
property interest of the other party"; (3) where, pursuant to section 4800(b) (3), "the
net value of the community property and the quasi-community property is less than
...$5,000 and one party cannot be located through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence"; and (4) where, pursuant to section 4800(c), the court has discretion to award
half of "community property personal injury damages" to the parties "as the court de-
termines to be just." Presumably all these exceptions apply in proceedings involving a
putative marriage since California Civil Code section 4452 (West Supp. 1972) specifi-
cally provides that the division of quasi-marital property "shall" be divided in accord-
ance with section 4800. Query, however, whether a court would allow an unequal di-
vision of property pursuant to California Civil Code section 4800(a) to be agreed upon
to the exclusion of a lawful spouse.
11. CAL. CIV. CoDa § 4452 (West Supp. 1972). This section provides that "prop-
erty acquired during the union which would have been community property or quasi-
community property if the union had not been void or voidable ... shall be termed
'quasi-marital property.'
12. The listing herein of several theories is not meant to be all inclusive.
See other bases for recovery in community property states referred to in W. DE FuNUK
& M. VAuGHN, PxrNcjPLEs OF CoMMuNrry PROPERTY 97 (2d ed. 1971). Some non-
California cases have held that the usual civil effects of a valid marriage accrue to a
lawful spouse. See Patton v. Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98 (1946);
Lee v. Smith, 18 Tex. 141 (1856). For an analysis of Louisiana cases dealing with pu-
tative marriage, see Comment, The Putatitve Marriage Doctrine in Louisana, 12 Loy-
OLA L. REv. (NEw ORLEANs) 89 (1965). For a discussion of Texas cases see W. DE
FuNrAx & M. VAUGHN, PRiNcIPLEs OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 105 (2d ed. 1971). Under
January 1973] THE PUTATIVE SPOUSE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ble principles. Under the first of these theories, relief was afforded to
the putative spouse by analogy to the laws of community property.
Thus, property which would have been community property had the
marriage been valid was treated as community property and divided
pursuant to the principles governing community property. 4 Despite
the availability of this doctrine, some courts used their inherent equita-
ble powers to grant relief and protect the rights of an innocent party
in property acquired by virtue of the joint efforts of such innocent
party and his or her supposed spouse. x5 One method utilized by the
courts in granting such equitable relief was to treat a putative spouse
relationship as a partnership or quasi-partnership. 6 The result in these
cases was apparently similar to the decisions following the quasi-com-
munity property theory. 17
The cases apply one or both18 of the above bases to allow a puta-
tive spouse to recover a share of the property jointly acquired during
the putative marriage. These cases can be conveniently divided into
the Texas view, a spouse who enters a putative relationship in good faith acquires the
same property rights as one entering a valid marriage. Hence property may be ac-
tual community property and not merely analogous to it. See G. MACKAY, COMMu-
ITY PROPERTY 973 (2d ed. 1925). Many cases also followed the "constructive trust"
theory where legal title is vested in the non-putative spouse but is also impressed with
a trust in favor of the putative spouse to the extent of his or her interest. Schwartz v.
United States, 191 F.2d 618, 622 (4th Cir. 1951); Titus v. Titus, 151 Kan. 824, 825,
101 P.2d 872, 873 (1940); Morin v. Kirkland, 226 Mass. 345, 348, 115 N.E. 414, 415
(1917); Batty v. Greene, 206 Mass. 561, 565, 92 N.E. 715, 716-17 (1910).
13. Since passage of the Family Law Act, such property is known in California
as "quasi-marital property." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1972). The term
"quasi-community property" still exists, but is no longer related to the putative spouse
doctrine. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4803 (West Supp. 1972).
14. Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 P. 533 (1920); Jackson v. Jack-
son, 94 Cal. 446, 463-64, 29 P. 957, 960 (1892) (Harrison, J., concurring).
15. Brown v. Brown, 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 79 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1969). Califor-
nia has long used the concept of equitable principles as a basis for awarding a divi-
sion of property to a putative spouse. E.g., Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 P. 441
(1911).
16. Sousa v. Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 666, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485, 489 (1970), "In
effect the innocent putative spouse was in partnership or a joint enterprise with her
spouse, contributing her services-and in this case, her earnings-to the common en-
terprise." For out of state cases following this theory, see Werner v. Werner, 59 Kan.
399, 402, 53 P. 127, 128 (1898); King v. Jackson, 196 Okla. 327, 329, 164 P.2d 974
(1945). See also H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 54 (1968). Cf. Grant,
How Much of a Partnership is Marriage?, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 249 (1972).
17. See cases cited note 14 supra.
18. Perhaps the most apt description of the California method of protecting the
putative spouse prior to the enactment of California Civil Code section 4452 (West
Supp. 1972) is "a judicially created equitable community property system anlogous
to the legal system." H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY 63-
7 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited VERRALL].
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two categories:'" (1) where the putative relationship terminates while
both supposed spouses are living and (2) where the putative relation-
ship terminates by death of one of the supposed spouses.
In 1911 the court considered Coats v. Coats,20 a case which fell
into the first category. The marriage was voidable by reason of the
putative spouse's physical incapacity. After the husband had ob-
tained a judgment annulling the marriage, the putative wife sued the
supposed husband to obtain a division of the property accumulated
during their relationship. The court held that she was entitled to an
equitable apportionment of the property, treating it as if it were the
community property of a valid marriage.2 1 In another case, where the
marriage was void as bigamous, it was further held that a putative
spouse was entitled to distribution of the "marital" property as if it
were community property.22  Where both parties innocently entered
into an incestuous relationship, the marriage thus being void, both were
held to be putative, and the property acquired with the supposed hus-
band's earnings was divided as if it were community property of a
valid marriage. 3  The results in these cases seem fair enough and, as
will be noted hereafter, are likely to be followed in cases interpreting
Civil Code section 4452.24
19. While a more sophisticated classification of cases may be possible, the pres-
ent two categories are satisfactory for purposes of analyzing of California Civil Code
section 4452.
20. 160 Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911). In Coats the putative spouse brought an
action after the supposed husband had obtained a judgment annuling the marriage.
California Civil Code section 4452 purports to apply only in proceedings to declare a
marriage void or voidable. It is submitted the legislative intent of section 4452 is best
served if the provisions of that section are applied in proceedings between the putative
spouse and the supposed spouse even if those proceedings are brought after a judgment
of nullity. Presumably, such later proceedings would normally only be instigated in
cases where the parties did not put the property at issue in the action to obtain a judg-
ment of nullity.
21. The court's reasoning is as follows: "If both have contributed to such ac-
quisitions, each has an interest which did not exist at the time of the marriage ...
In the absence of fraud or other ground affecting the right to claim relief, there can
be no good reason for saying that either party should, by reason of the annulment, be
vested with title to all of the property acquired during the existence of the supposed
marriage ...
"The apportionment of such property between the parties is not provided by any
statute. It must, therefore, be made on equitable principles. In the absence of special
circumstances, such as might arise through intervening claims of third persons, we can
conceive of no more equitable basis of apportionment than an equal division." 160
Cal. at 676, 678, 118 P. at 443, 444.
22. Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 P. 533 (1920).
23. Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 354, 295 P. 339 (1931).
24. See M. FREEmAN, W. HOGOnOOM, W. McFADDEN & L. OLsoN, ATToRNEY's
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All these cases were decided when no prior legal marriage had
existed. However, the courts also protected the putative spouse when
the legal wife claimed an interest in property acquired by the joint ef-
forts of the husband and a putative wife during a subsequent putative
marriage. Twenty-three years after her husband had abandoned her,
the legal wife in Blache v. Blache25 brought a separate maintenance ac-
tion seeking a share of the property which had been accumulated by
her husband and his putative spouse. The court held that the legal
wife may share only in the husband's half of the "quasi-marital" prop-
erty accumulated during the putative marriage.2 6  Thus, the putative
wife was entitled to one half of the quasi-marital property free of any
claims by the legal wife. However, in Brown v. Brown,27 the court
held that the legal wife may be estopped to claim a share of the assets
accumulated by the legal husband and his putative wife. The court
reasoned that the legal wife's acquiescence and silence during the
twenty-eight year putative marriage permitted the rights of the putative
wife to intervene to the total exclusion of the legal wife, except as to
support.2 1
In cases where death terminates the putative relationship and where
no legal spouse is involved, the putative spouse has been given the en-
tire quasi-marital estate upon the intestacy of the supposed husband. 29
Yet, where the supposed spouse dies intestate, leaving both a legal
spouse and a putative spouse surviving, the legal spouse receives one-
half of the quasi-marital property and the putative spouse receives the
GUIDE TO FAMILY LAW ACT PRACTICE 272 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as ATTOR-
NEY'S GUIDE].
25. 69 Cal. App. 2d 616, 160 P.2d 136 (1945).
26. The court did not use the term "quasi-marital"; it is used herein at times for
convenience only to describe the nature of the assets as they would now be classified.
The opinion also indicated that the legal wife might, under proper circumstances, be
barred by estoppel, waiver or abandonment from recovering at all. Id. at 624, 160
P.2d at 140-41. Accord, Brown v. Brown, 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 79 Cal. Rptr. 257
(1969).
27. 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 79 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1969).
28. Id. at 192, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 266. The court stated that although the legal
wife was estopped from claiming a community property interest in the property ac-
quired by her husband and his putative spouse, she was not estopped from seeking
reasonable alimony from her husband. The case was reversed to determine the ali-
mony issue in accordance with the husband's financial position and his legal wife's
needs.
29. Estate of Krone, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 769-70, 189 P.2d 741, 743 (1948). The
court stated: "[Ilf according to statute the survivor of a valid, ceremonial marriage
shall be entitled to take all of the community estate upon its dissolution, then by parity
of reasoning why should not the wife inherit the entire estate of a putative union upon
the death of her husband intestate? Clearly she does inherit all."
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remaining one-half.3 0 However, if the supposed spouse by will pur-
ports to leave his entire estate to the putative spouse, Sousa v. Freitas"1
holds that the putative spouse is "entitled to one-half of her own right;
plus the half of the community property decedent was entitled to
devise, or another one-quarter of the whole?'3 2 leaving the legal wife
with but one-quarter of the entire estate.33
The Effect of Section 4452 on Prior Remedies
The new section 4452 by itself would not necessarily require a dif-
ferent result in any of the previously discussed decisions. It merely
makes statutory the previously recognized property rights of a putative
spouse when there is a void or voidable marriage. 34  The section also
settles the issue as to the status of quasi-community property by spe-
cifically including such property in the description of "quasi-marital"
property."5 It further prescribes the manner in which quasi-marital
property shall be divided,30 whereas prior to the enactment of section
4452 the division was left to the discretion of the court in the exercise
of its equitable powers.3 7
30. Estate of Ricci, 201 Cal. App. 2d 146, 19 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1962).
31. 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970).
32. Id. at 666, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
33. Id. The "equitable" nature of the division of property was referred to by the
court in Sousa when it stated: "We do not undertake to state that this analysis would
be equitable in all cases, but we are satisfied that it is under the facts here." 10 Cal.
App. 3d at 666, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 489. The court in Sousa referred to Civil Code section
4452 (West Supp. 1972). but stated that the provision did not resolve the conflicting
claims of the lawful and the putative spouse. Id. at 666 n.4, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 489 n.4.
34. ATroaNEY's GuiDE, supra note 24, at 272. The authors state: "[Civil Code]
4452 does more than simply codify prior law. Before the Family Law Act, there was
no statutory authority for awarding a putative spouse any share of the property accum-
ulated during the supposed marriage. . . ." Id.
35. The lack of direct decisional authority on the point indicates the issue of the
status of property analogous to "quasi-community property" has not often arisen in pu-
tative marriage actions. Civil Code section 4803 (West Supp. 1972) defines "quasi-
community property" as used in the Family Law Act.
36. "[lf the division of property is in issue [the court] shall divide, in ac-
cordance with Section 4800, that property .... ." CAL. Civ. CoDE § 4452 (West
Supp. 1972). One can infer from this that if the parties did not place the property in
issue in a proceeding to obtain a judgment of nullity of marriage, they can later liti-
gate the property issue. The section also provides that "[Ihf the court expressly re-
serves jurisdiction, it may make the property division at a time subsequent to the judg-
ment." Id. Apparently, this was included to conform to Civil Code section 4800(a)
(West Supp. 1972) which allows the court, in dissolution proceedings, to dispose of the
property "at a later time" if it expressly reserves jurisdiction to do so. Even if a court
decided section 4452 did not apply to litigation other than proceedings to obtain a judg-
ment of nullity of marriage, it would seem logical that it would follow the essence of
Civil Code section 4800 and-divide the property equally.
37. See cases cited notes 25, 27, 29-31 supra.
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One change from prior case law may be anticipated by viewing
two new statutes together. Section 4452 does not purport to provide
for the situation where the legal wife claims an interest in quasi-marital
property. By providing the putative spouse with a statutory right to
one-half of the quasi-marital property, by inference section 4452 leaves
the remaining one-half to be divided between the husband and his legal
spouse. 3s  This latter one-half may be dramatically affected by Civil
Code section 5118. That statute, as amended in 1971, provides:
The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor chil-
dren living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while living sepa-
rate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of
the spouse.3 9
The significance of this section in the context of section 4452 can
best be appreciated if it is recognized that in most, if not all, of the re-
ported decisions involving a putative spouse, the supposed husband did
in fact separate from his lawful wife.4" Section 5118 requires that
earnings and accumulations acquired after separation be classified as
the separate property of the acquiring spouse. Thus, in the typical
case, a legal wife will have no claim to assets acquired by a husband
while he is living with a putative spouse. Of course, community prop-
erty assets taken from the legal community do not lose their community
character by virtue of the fact that a married spouse enters into a subse-
quent putative relationship. 41 To the extent that a court is influenced
38. See note 33 & accompanying text, supra.
39. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1972). Prior to the 1971 amendment,
only the wife's earnings after separation were separate property. The husband's earnings
and accumulations continued to be community property until the rendition of an inter-
locutory judgment of dissolution. Civil Code section 5119 (West Supp. 1972), as
amended in 1971, also provides: "After the rendition of a judgment decreeing legal
separation of the parties, the earnings or accumulations of each party are the separate
property of the party acquiring such earnings or accumulations." Thus "the earnings
and accumulations of either spouse received after actual separation . . . at a judgment
of legal separation . . . are that spouse's separate property." ATTORNEY's GUIDE,
supra note 24, at 247.
40. E.g., Sousa v. Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970) (fifty
years from time of separation to claim by wife in decedent's estate); Brown v. Brown,
274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 79 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1969) (wife brought action thirty-five years
after separation); Estate of Ricci, 201 Cal. App. 2d 146, 19 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1962)
(thirty-seven years from time of separation to claim by wife in decedent's estate);
Blache v. Blache, 69 Cal. App. 2d 616, 160 P.2d 136 (1945) (wife brought action
twenty-four years after separation). Typically the assets in all the above cases were
those acquired with earnings of the husbands after separation from his lawful spouse.
Presumably, Civil Code section 5118 does not apply retroactively. Cf. Addison
v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 399 P.2d 897 (1965). Thus the full im-
pact of the section may not be felt for some time.
41. Problems of apportionment may well arise. E.g., Modem Woodmen of Amer-
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by some hardship suffered by the legal wife if she is denied a share of
the post-separation earnings and accumulations of her husband, a court
may very well decide, in its discretion, to award support to the legal
spouse to assist her in the event of financial need.42
What effect, if any, will section 4452 have on the conflicting
claims between the legal wife and the putative wife when the "husband"
dies? Seemingly the section changes nothing. As stated by Profes-
sors Verrall and Sammis:
As the 1969 legislation was directed to marriage and divorce prob-
lems. . . the partial statutory recognition of the equitable commu-
nity property system would seem to leave the rest of that system in-
tact. On the ending of a putative relationship by death the equi-
table division of the property probably would continue.43
However, the impact of Civil Code section 511844 may well be felt in
such cases. Most of the cases in the past involved post-separation as-
sets accumulated by the decedent after he separated from his legal
wife,4" and future cases probably will involve contests over the division
of such accumulations.
Impact of Section 445546 Upon Support
Rights of a Putative Spouse
In the past, California courts held that a putative wife may re-
cover from her supposed husband the reasonable value of her services
rendered to him during the putative relationship 7  The supposed
husband ordinarily was given an offset for support and maintenance
furnished to the putative wife during the relationship. 48  This judicially
created right of a putative spouse was necessitated by the general rule
that prohibited awarding permanent alimony or spousal support to a
party of an invalid marriage.49
ica v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 P. 754 (1931). See also cases cited in VEluALL,
supra note 18, at 188-89.
42. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 79 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1969). Such
relief would also appear to be called for by Civil Code section 4801 (West Supp. 1972)
which bases a legal spouse's right to support on the supported spouse's need and the
supporting spouse's ability to pay.
43. VER ALL, supra note 18, 64.
44. See text at note 39 supra.
45. See cases cited note 40 supra.
46. CAL. Crvn CODE § 4455 (West Supp. 1972); see text accompanying note
66 infra.
47. Marsh v. Marsh, 79 Cal. App. 560, 571, 250 P. 411, 415 (1926); Mixer v.
Mixer, 2 Cal. App. 227, 231, 83 P. 273, 274 (1905).
48. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937), noted in 111
A.L.R. 342 (1937).
49. Id. Some early non-California cases held that the putative wife had no basis
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Pre-Section 4455 Recoveries in Quantum Meruit
In at least three situations a putative spouse historically has been
held to quantum meruit recovery in California.5 ° The first is where
relief is granted to the putative wife who was fraudulently induced to
believe she was married and where there is no jointly acquired prop-
erty to divide upon termination of the relationship. In Mixer v. Mix-
er,51 an early California case, a putative spouse was led to believe that
she had been married to her supposed husband while under the influ-
ence of drugs he had administered to her. Upon termination of the
relationship, she sought fifty dollars per month as the reasonable value
of her services during the putative relationship. The supposed husband
claimed that since the services were of an immoral nature, any contract
between them was illegal and unenforceable. The court held that the
husband could not avail himself of his own fraud to escape liability,
and awarded the putative wife a money judgment.5 2
The second situation occurs when relief is granted the putative
wife upon dissolution of the relationship because of the husband's mis-
conduct not amounting to fraud and there is no jointly owned property.
In the leading case of Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti5 3 the ostensible hus-
band was granted an annulment on the basis that wife's first marriage
had not been terminated. The California Supreme Court held that the
putative wife was entitled to be paid "in so far as her services exceeded
in value the support provided by her supposed husband" where the
"de facto husband committed acts of cruelty which if the marriage had
been valid would constitute cause for divorce." 5' The court distin-
guished this case from those where the putative spouse was fraudulently
induced by the nonputative spouse to enter into the relationship. 5"
for recovery where she performed domestic services on behalf of her supposed hus-
band. E.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892 (1888). For a review of
cases in California through 1948, see 37 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (1949).
50. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937); Lazzarevich v.
Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948); Mixer v. Mixer, 2 Cal. App.
227, 83 P. 273 (1905). For discussion of quantum meruit recovery cases, see 4 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 11 (7th ed. 1960).
51. 2 Cal. App. 227, 83 P. 273 (1905).
52. For similar holdings in non-California cases, see Higgins v. Breen, 9 Mo.
497 (1845); Estate of Fox, 178 Wis. 369, 371-72, 190 N.W. 90, 91 (1922).
53. 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937).
54. Id. at 101, 69 P.2d at 848.
55. Cases cited notes 47 & 52 supra. In a dictum the opinion stated that the basis
of relief in cases where the invalid marriage was procured by fraud was quasi-contrac-
tual. An award was made to prevent unjust enrichment of the fraudulent spouse.
The opinion indicated that the meretricious husband was unjustly enriched by the
amount which the reasonable value of the services rendered to him by his putative
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The third circumstance arises where the putative spouse recovers
for her services and there is no jointly acquired property except that
which is held in joint tenancy. Even though the husband was not
guilty of fraud or marital misconduct, such an award was held proper
in Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich.56 In that case, husband and wife lived
together after the entry of a final decree of divorce, both believing they
were still validly married. Upon termination of this putative relation-
ship, the wife was awarded a sum equal to her services and contributions
less the value of maintenance and support supplied her by the sup-
posed husband. While the court cited Sanguinetti,5 7 it also relied on
the Restatement of Restitution.58 Thus neither fault nor fraud was
deemed necessary for recovery. Despite rather strenuous objections to
awarding a putative spouse relief in the absence of fraud or marital
misconduct, 9 the court's approach in Lazzarevich was an enlightened
one. Under well established restitutionary principles, one who has
conferred a benefit upon another is entitled to recover in quasi con-
tract.60 Failure to grant this recovery would unjustly enrich a sup-
wife exceeded the amount devoted by him to her support and maintenance. As has
been pointed out in several cases, there must be proof of the services actually rendered.
Middlecoff v. Middlecoff, 160 Cal. App. 2d 22, 324 P.2d 669 (1958). For criticism of
later cases purportedly misciting Sanguinetti, see also, 1 B. ARMSTRONG, CALIFORNIA
FAMILY LAw 864 (1953) [hereinafter cited ARmSTRONG].
56. 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948).
57. 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937). One author states that Lazzarevich
"contained a review of the Sanguinetti case which made no reference to the fact that
that decision rested on the assumption that there had been marital misconduct which
would have justified divorce had the marriage been valid ....... 1 ARMSTRONG, supra
note 55, at 866-67. In view of the heavy reliance upon section 40 of the Restatement
of Restitution, it may well have been that the court in Lazzarevich consciously chose
to ignore the element of "fault." If so the court was quite correct in doing so. As is
stated in an early treatise: "By far the most important and most numerous illustrations
of the scope of quasi-contract are found in those cases where the plaintiff's right to re-
cover rests upon the doctrine that a man shall not be allowed to enrich himself un-
justly at the expense of another." W. KEENER, QUAsI-CoNTRACrs 19 (1893). See also
Comment, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50 CALIF. L.
Rav. 866, 873 (1962).
58. 88 Cal. App. 2d at 715-16, 200 P.2d at 53, citing RESTATEmmNT OF RusTrru-
TION § 40 (1937). Comment a points out that "the rule stated in this Clause is ap-
plicable both where the services are obtained by a consciously false statement and where
they are the result of an innocent but material misstatement. The fact that the one
rendering services does not expect to be compensated therefor or otherwise to receive
benefit is immaterial."
59. Comment, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50
CALIF. L. RPv. 866, 873 (1962).
60. Abbott, Mistake of Fact as a Ground for Affirmative Equitable Relief, 23
HA V. L. REv. 608 (1910); Holdsworth, Unjustifiable Enrichment, 55 L.Q. REv. 37
(1939). For an outstanding collection of source material in this area see Wade, The
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posed husband. Further, a putative wife may suffer an unconscionable
loss. Therefore, concerns about fraud and fault seem to be irrelevant.
This is particularly true when fault has been eliminated as a basis for
dissolution of a marriage in California.6 1
Section 4455-the Putative Spouse's Right to Support
The California decisions considered so far have dealt with the right
of a putative spouse to recover in quantum meruit the reasonable value
of her services. By contrast, California has followed the overwhelming
weight of authority in denying a putative spouse the right to recover ali-
mony or spousal support. 62  In Millar v. Millar,63 for example, the
"wife" sought permanent support upon a decree of annulment, argu-
ing that the general divorce statutes should be construed to include an-
nulment actions. The court refused to so construe the statutes.64
Rather, it indicated that the obligation of support arises from the mari-
tal relation, and, therefore, where a marriage is declared a nullity, there
is no basis for such an obligation. Later California decisions have not
Literature of the Law of Restitution, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1968). For a fairly re-
cent California decision dealing with the necessity of conferring a benefit for recovery
in quasi-contract actions, see Coleman Engineering Co. v. North America Aviation, Inc.
65 Cal. 2d 396, 420 P.2d 713, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966), noted in 19 HASTINGS L.J.
1259 (1968).
61. The two grounds for dissolution of a marriage are irreconcilable differences
which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage, and incurable insanity.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970). Testimony and evidence presented in legislative
hearings indicated general unanimity in the belief that the "fault" concept as utilized
in California under former California Civil Code section 92 was replete with artificial
standards and the often manufactured testimony presented at divorce trials bore very
little relationship to the fact that a non-viable marriage existed. 4 JOURNAL OF CALI-
FORNIA AssEMBLY, 1969 Reg. Sess. 8056-57. A system which inflexibly character-
izes one spouse as "innocent" and the other as "guilty" simply does not conform
to realistic methods of assessing human behavior. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 30 [hereinafter cited GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION].
62. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937); Millar v. Mil-
lar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 P. 394 (1917); Middlecoff v. Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d 286,
340 P.2d 331 (1959). For decisions in states other than California, see Dackman v.
Dackman, 252 Md. 331, 343-44, 250 A.2d 60, 67-68 (1969); Wooten v. District Court,
57 Mont. 517, 531, 189 P.2d 233, 234-35 (1920); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 109 N.J. Super.
410, 415, 263 A.2d 490 (1970); Whitebird v. Luckey, 180 Okla. 1, 2, 67 P.2d 775, 777
(1937); Stewart v. Vandervort, 34 W. Va. 524, 527, 12 S.E. 736, 738 (1890). "Ali-
mony" was the word commonly used prior to the enactment of the Family Law Act.
Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1700, § 7, at 3912 (repealed 1969). The word "support" is now
generally used to refer to support of both spouse and children. CAL. CIV. CODE § §
4351, 4357, 4801.
63. 175 Cal. 797, 167 P. 394 (1917).
64. Id. at 807, 167 P. at 398.
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departed from this rule.65
In granting a putative spouse the right to spousal support, Civil
Code section 4455 states:
The court may . . . order a party to pay for the support of the
other party in the same manner as if the marriage had not been
void or voidable. .... 66
By enacting this statute the legislature clearly intended to make a puta-
tive and legal spouse's support rights the same. However, a critical is-
sue which undoubtedly will arise is -whether the California Legislature
intended section 4455 to be the exclusive remedy to provide support to
the putative spouse, i.e., whether it was intended to abrogate the tradi-
tional quantum meruit rights.
Legislative Intent
The moving force behind the comprehensive revision of Califor-
nia's divorce laws, as implemented in The Family Law Act of 1969,67
was the Governor's Commission on the Family. Appointed by former
governor Edmund G. Brown in early 1966, the commission was com-
posed of social workers, legislators, doctors, and members of the bar and
judiciary.68  Among various recommendations, the commission urged
that courts have authority to award permanent alimony to an innocent
spouse "following a declaration of nullity, by analogy to the laws gov-
erning the division of community property and alimony."'6 9 To imple-
65. E.g., Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937). A few
non-California decisions have awarded alimony in annulment actions without statutory
authorization. E.g., Jones v. Jones, 48 Wash. 2d 862, 296 P.2d 1010 (1956). Here
the Supreme Court of Washington interpreted a Washington statute as permitting ali-
mony to be awarded in divorce cases and annulment proceedings. Aware of the in-
equities which can result from the harsh rule denying support to a putative spouse,
many legislatures enacted statutes permitting the court to make an award of permanent
support upon a decree of annulment. ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.210 (1962); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ReV. § 46-28 (1958); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-24 (1968); IOWA CoDE ANN.
§ 598.24 (1950); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1968); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236
(1964); ORE. REv. STAT. § 107.105 (1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 20.107 (Supp. 1972);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.08.110 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.245 (West Supp.
1972).
66. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4455 (West Supp. 1972).
67. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608.
68. GovERNoR's COMmrssION, supra note 61, at 146-47.
69. Id. at 37. It should be noted that the Commission recommended elimination
of all grounds for annulment except incest and known bigamy. The Commission felt
that as to all other grounds for nullity "the essential question presented in the annul-
ment of a voidable marriage does not differ from that presented in any dissolution of
marriage case .... We believe, therefore, that the successful operation of the Family
Court demands that the same standard govern annulments of voidable marriages as gov-
erns other dissolution proceedings, and we recommend . . . the coalescence of all dis-
solution proceedings (save for declaration of nullity in the case of void marriages) into
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ment this recommendation, the commission drafted a model statute.70
The comments to this statute stated that it was intended to conform
the support rights of a putative spouse to those of a legal spouse. The
commission's comment read as follows:
It is the intent of the Commission thereby to negate the effect of
such cases as Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti . . .insofar as they deny
the putative wife's right to support. We believe that the Court
should be able to award support to an innocent spouse who has
lived with another person in good faith for a number of years, only
to find that the marriage was void. To take account of such cases,
the courts have used the fiction of the "value of services rendered"
or have invoked an estoppel to deny the putative wife's claim.
The Commission intends that this Section accomplish directly
what has been done indirectly in equitable situations.71
Pursuant to the commission's recommendation, the original section
4455 was enacted. 72 While no cases are reported which construed the
1969 statute, certain ambiguities emerged rather readily. The most
significant difficulty was that the 1969 statute arguably modified the
traditional view that a remedy would be afforded a putative spouse
even when that spouse had innocently been the cause of the impedi-
ment to the marriage. 3  Perhaps in recognition of this problem, the
legislature amended the section in 1970,71 eliminating the requirement
that the recipient spouse be "innocent of fraud or wrongdoing." The
section presently reads:
The court may, during the pendency of a proceeding to have a mar-
riage adjudged a nullity or upon judgment, order a party to pay for
the support of the other party in the same manner as if the mar-
riage had not been void or voidable, provided that the party for
whose benefit the order is made is found to be a putative
spouse.
7 5
Thus, under the 1970 amendment to section 4455, the recipient spouse
need only be "putative." Presumably, this reference to "putative" re-
fers to that concept as developed by the courts in California.76
a single form of action governed by a single standard." GovERNoR's COMMISSION,
supra note 61, at 35-36. The Legislature, however, did not adopt this recommendation;
it retained all of the traditional grounds. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4425 (West 1970);
JOURNAL OF CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, 1969 Reg. Sess. 8053, 8055-63.
70. GOVmNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 75.
71. Jd. at 76.
72. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8 at 3323.
73. E.g., Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937). The
putative spouse was allowed a quantum meruit award upon annulment of the marriage
based on her prior undissolved marriage.
74. Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 1545, § 1, at 3139.
75. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4455 (West Supp. 1972).
76. Cases and text accompanying notes 4-5 supra. California Civil Code section
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The Effect of Section 4455 on Prior Remedies
The history of the present section, coupled with the commission's
comments and other facts to be noted, indicate that section 4455 was
intended to supersede the quantum meruit remedy formerly available
to a putative spouse. The statute obviously was prompted by the Re-
port of the Governor's Commission on the Family. That report stated
that "[tihe Commission intends that this Section accomplish directly
what has been done indirectly in equitable situations. '' 7r In view of
the comprehensive coverage of the Family Law Act and the clear legisla-
tive intent that fault now is irrelevant, it seems logical that recovery un-
der section 4455 was intended to be in lieu of rights theretofore ob-
tained by decisions which were based upon principles of equity.78
A second argument that section 4455 was intended to supersede
case-made quantum meruit rights is found in the opinions which quite
clearly indicate that such a remedy was in lieu of the right to support
which then accrued exclusively to a lawful wife. In Sanguinetti v.
Sanguinetti,79 the supreme court pointed out that a legal right to ali-
mony existed for the legal spouse, but that she had no right to quantum
meruit. On the other hand, the court noted that the putative spouse
had no right to alimony, but she did have the equitable quantum meruit
remedy. 0 Since the rationale for granting equitable relief has been
based on the inability to grant alimony, there is no need to consider
an alternative remedy in the nature of quantum meruit when the right
to spousal support is granted expressly by section 4455.
Two additional factors lead to the conclusion that section 4455 is
intended to supersede the putative spouse's traditional quantum meruit
remedy. First, equity traditionally does not grant a remedy when an
4452 (West Supp. 1972) provides, in part: "'[W]henever a determination is made that
a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or both parties be-
lieved in good faith that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such party or
parties to have the status of a putative spouse."
77. GovF.Roa's CoMMssI ON, supra note 61, at 77.
78. The word "logical" in the textual material is used advisedly. The difficult
cases are those in which the interpretative issue was not foreseen by legislators re-
sponsible for an enactment. In such cases, courts must perform the originative func-
tion of, in effect, assigning to a statute a meaning which it did not possess before ju-
dicial action. Cardozo had this in mind when he wrote: "interpretation is often
spoken of as if it were nothing but a search and the discovery of a meaning which, how-
ever, obscure and latent, had none the less a real and ascertainable preexistence in
the legislator's mind. The process, is indeed, that at times, but it is often something
more." B. CARnozo, ThE NATuRE oF Tm Jumkc . PaocEss 14 (1921).
79. 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937).
80. Id. at 100, 69 P.2d at 847 (1937).
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adequate remedy exists at law." One test of adequacy is whether the
remedy at law is as speedy, practical and just as the equitable remedy.8 2
That the putative spouse's quantum meruit remedy is equitable in na-
ture already has been established.8 3 Thus, since section 4455 provides
an entirely adequate remedy for the putative spouse, equitable inter-
vention apparently is not necessary. The second factor leading to the
conclusion that section 4455 constitutes the exclusive remedy of the
putative spouse is based more on reason than legal theory or principle:
It would seem highly unlikely that the legislature intended to grant a
remedy to a putative spouse that is not available to a lawful spouse.
It is difficult to speculate at this time whether a judicial extension
of the statutory rights conferred upon the putative spouse is necessary
or desirable. Aside from the undesirable consequences inherent in a
multiplicity of actions, there is a limit to attaining essential justice in the
area involving the rights of a putative spouse. Although arguments to
the contrary could be raised, analysis and logic indicate that courts will
hold that Civil Code section 4455 was intended by the legislature to be
the exclusive remedy of a putative spouse insofar as support rights are
concerned.
Conclusion
By enacting Civil Code sections 4452 and 4455 the California
legislature intended to give statutory force and direction to two areas
of family law that heretofore have been a matter of court-made law
alone. In the case of section 4452, the legislature apparently intends
to follow the established case law in allowing a putative spouse quasi-
marital property rights in property which would have been community
property if the supposed marriage had not been void or voidable. The
more complicated situation where both a putative spouse and a legal
spouse claim a portion of a deceased spouse's estate was decided in the
1969 case of Sousa v. Freitas84 However, the 1970 amendment to
Civil Code section 5118 certainly will alter the award of property in
a situation such as that in Sousa v. Freitas, since earnings and accumu-
lations of either legal spouse are separate property when the spouses are
living separate and apart. Hence, the putative spouse now will get a
81. W. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQuITY 42 (2d ed. 1956); W. WALSH,
WALSH ON EQUITY § 25 (1930).
82. Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 147 P. 259 (1915); Wuest v. Wuest, 53 Cal.
App. 2d 339, 127 P.2d 934 (1942).
83. See cases cited in notes 51-60 supra.
84. 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 59 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970).
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larger portion of the other's property, and the legal spouse will have
a much smaller community property claim, if any claim at all. How-
ever, under section 4801 the legal spouse still is entitled to spousal sup-
port based on his or her need and the supporting spouse's ability to pay.
This right to support granted by section 4801 has been extended to
the putative spouse as well by section 4455. This article has shown
that the legislature intends section 4455 to abrogate the old quantum
meruit recovery for a putative spouse. This is in keeping with the gen-
eral intent manifested in the 1966 governor's commission report. That
report recommended the elimination of differences between the support
rights of a putative spouse and those of a legal spouse. By giving a
putative spouse the same property and support rights as a legal spouse,
the legislature, in enacting sections 4452 and 4455, appears to have
accomplished the commission's intent-"to award support to an inno-
cent spouse who has lived with another person in good faith for a num-
ber of years, only to find that the marriage was void."8' 5
85. GovERNoR's COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 76.
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